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Doppelgänger's Cloned News Sites: A Russian Operation Aimed at Three Elections

Manipulation Breakdowns · 6 min read · By D0

On October 16, the threat-intelligence firm Alethea published a report on Operation Doppelgänger, a Russian influence operation. Alethea says it is running against three elections at once: the US midterms on November 3, Israel’s vote on October 27, and France’s 2027 presidential race.

One figure stands out. Alethea says the fake news sites used in this wave were built and held in reserve for 17 months before they went live.

This article covers what Alethea reports, what the report does not show, and how to check a news link that looks right but may not be.

What Alethea Reports

Alethea names two operators: the Social Design Agency and Structura. Reporting relayed by the Ukrainian outlet LB.ua says the Social Design Agency is under US and EU sanctions.

According to Alethea’s summary page, the wave ran like this:

  • Posting. More than 50 fake accounts posted in synchronized waves from October 7 to 9.
  • Amplification. A second network of more than 1,000 bot accounts boosted those posts. Alethea estimates 150,000 or more quote-posts on X.
  • Destination. The posts linked to clones of real outlets: Walla! News in Israel, and Le Parisien and Le Point in France.
  • Languages. Six narratives ran in English, French and Hebrew.
  • Search. Fabricated articles from the clone sites are already indexed by Google. Alethea warns that AI assistants could cite them when asked about the elections.

The limits of this sourcing matter. This article relies on Alethea’s public summary page and on LB.ua’s account of Alethea and the New York Times. The full report holds the attribution evidence, and it was not available for this piece.

Alethea is a company that sells threat intelligence, and its page links to a demo request. The 150,000 figure is its own estimate. Treat the numbers as one vendor’s findings until another researcher repeats them.

1. Borrowed Credibility

The clone sites copy outlets that readers already trust. A reader who sees the Le Parisien layout extends to the page the trust that Le Parisien earned over decades.

This method works on a habit: people judge a page by how it looks.

The operation does not need to persuade anyone of anything strange. It needs the reader to believe the page is what it appears to be.

2. Sites Held in Reserve

Seventeen months is a long time to leave a site idle. Alethea does not say why in the summary, so the reason below is an inference.

New domains are easy to flag. Older domains with pages already indexed by search engines look more ordinary. An operator that waits gets a site that a filter has no reason to distrust.

The practical result is that domain age alone is a weaker check than it used to be. A site registered long ago can still be a clone set up for this operation.

3. Manufactured Conversation

The first group of accounts posts. The second group of more than 1,000 quotes and answers them. To a reader scrolling past, a post with many quotes looks like something people are arguing about.

This is social proof built by machine. The quote count is generated by bots, not by readers.

Alethea’s founder, Lisa Kaplan, said individual posts drew few views. LB.ua, relaying the Times, says the volume of posts and comments suggests the campaign “may have reached an audience.” That is a hedge, and it should be read as one. Reach has not been measured in public.

LB.ua reports that the more than 50 accounts often posed as Israeli women. If that holds, the personas were chosen to look like ordinary local voices, which is a standard way to make a foreign message look like it comes from local people.

4. A Wedge Narrative

According to LB.ua’s account, the posts push the idea that bipartisan US support for Israel is weakening. LB.ua says the campaign aims to deepen political divisions in the United States, including over support for Israel.

Hold two things apart here. Whether US support for Israel is shifting is a question for polling and voting records. A Russian operation pushing the claim does not settle it, either way.

The operation wants you to react to the topic, not to check the claim. Judge the claim on its evidence, and judge the messenger on its record.

5. Targeting the Search Box and the Chatbot

Alethea’s warning about indexing is the part most readers can act on. If a clone article ranks in search, or an AI assistant retrieves it, the reader may never see the social post that carried it.

The link then arrives with no visible history. It looks like a news result.

Alethea says the clone articles are already in Google’s index, so they can reach readers through search and AI answers as well as social feeds.

What the Report Does Not Show

Alethea has not shown, in the public summary, that any voter changed a vote. Reach is an estimate of posts, not of people persuaded.

LB.ua also relays the Times on the US response. US officials said they were not aware of the specific campaign Alethea described. They did confirm increased activity by the network and the Social Design Agency before the midterms.

The Times also reported in September, citing US intelligence assessments, that the Kremlin approved a campaign to amplify US divisions. Those assessments found no evidence of attempts to interfere with election systems.

Influence and tampering are different things. The evidence so far points to the first.

What This Is Not

This piece reports one vendor’s public findings; it does not show that any vote changed, and it does not treat every post about US–Israel support as Russian.

  1. Read the address letter by letter. Clone domains often add a word, swap a letter, or use a different ending. Check the part before the first slash.
  2. Go to the outlet yourself. Type the outlet’s address into your browser. Search the headline on its homepage. A real story will be there.
  3. Check the footer and the About page. Look for a named editor, a physical address, and a corrections policy. Clones tend to copy the layout and skip the people.
  4. Do not rely on domain age alone. Look up the registration date, but remember that an old site can still be a clone.
  5. Open what the chatbot cites. If an AI assistant names a news source about an election, open the link and read the address before you repeat it.
  6. Look at who posted the link. An account created recently that posts only about one topic, and is quoted by many similar accounts, is a signal to slow down.

What to Watch For

Israel votes on October 27 and the US on November 3. Expect links that look like Walla!, Le Parisien or Le Point to appear in replies and quote-posts from new accounts.

Before you share one, open the outlet’s own site and look for the story. If it is not there, do not pass it on.


This article is part of Decipon’s Manipulation Breakdowns series, examining specific influence operations through the Influence Tactics Protocol.


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